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A WIDER CIRCULATION

One definite conclusion reached by the fifty members of the Fellowship who attended the Spring Conference in New Jersey in May was that a special effort should be made during the next year to win a wider circulation for our magazine. Since we do not have enough copies nor enough money to send out samples indiscriminately, we must depend on present readers to submit names of friends or acquaintances who may become subscribers. The Editorial Board asks you to cooperate in this special effort by sending a list of good prospects to Mrs. Nola Meade, 3041 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y.

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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

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DITORIALS

Employment Practices Act

he F.E.P.A. has been defeated in the ted States Senate, at least indirectly. as been impossible to win a two thirds to impose cloture, which means that outhern filibuster can prevent passage ne act. Southern liberals were without ption opposed to the bill, though some iem were also opposed to the practice ilibuster.

he act, which sought to bring govern- al pressure upon employment prac- is part of a general program of the r Deal," which also includes a federal lynching bill and an anti-poll tax bill, gned to force the southern states to t the negro minority more equal rights. is a laudable end. It is important that our moral, spiritual, and political re- ces be used to give our negro fellow- ns every democratic privilege which enjoy. The negro problem in this try is on the one hand a contest be- n the old institution of slavery and the t of democracy. History has proved an institution like slavery, even when ished by law, lives on vestigially. On other hand the problem is older than nation, being a manifestation of race which expresses itself in every en- ter between different races, particularly n one race has a minority status.

cent supreme court decisions, forcing hern states to grant negroes equality in -state transportation and in college ation, prove that law may be a potent weapon in enforcing rights. Within limits it is possible for a total national community to insist legally that every portion of the community observe its minimal standards of justice. Thus, too, court decisions have forced some of the southern states to admit negroes to party primaries. It is clear, in other words, that the power of law is considerable in raising democratic standards of a community.

But the law is not omnipotent. The very fact that the emancipation proclamation did not abolish slavery absolutely, and that the federal grant of suffrage to all negroes has been circumvented in southern states for two generations proves that there are limits to the power of law. A study of these limits may lead to the conclusion that a Federal act, enforcing fair employment, is futile. It obviously can not be passed. It probably could not be enforced, if it were passed. In stating such a conclusion we are flying in the face of an almost unanimous "liberal" opinion, inside and outside of the churches. But liberal opinion has again and again failed to observe that the potency of law has its limits. We learned a lesson in the prohibition movement which we seem already to have forgotten. That lesson was that a determined minority, if it is locally a majority, whether in a city or a state, is able to defy, evade, or nullify a law passed by a national majority. It will do so if the law goes too far beyond the moral or social standards of community. Laws can only be enforced upon recalcitrant minorities. The majority of the

community must accept a law without enforcement, if it is to be enforceable. But if individual recalcitrance has the support of a local community, if the "conscience" of the community aids and abets defiance, no amount of enforcement by coercion avails.

This is why laws enforcing fair employment in individual states differ from federal laws. In a state, e.g. New York, such a law proves efficacious because the majority behind the law registers a moral climate which makes the law enforceable. But if the federal government forces such a law upon a reluctant state it tends to produce a reaction of defiance rather than compliance. This is particularly true in our south where "Yankee interference" is regarded as almost synonymous with "foreign" interference. This is a legacy of the civil war. It proves that the northern victory did not, and could not, completely heal the breach in the national community.

It must not be denied that a law has considerable power in changing the moral climate of a community. If, say, 53% of a population is in favor of a certain social standard, the enactment of that standard into law gives it sufficient majesty to persuade possibly 90% of the population that the law ought to be obeyed. But if only 33% of the population accepts the standard which the law embodies, it is always possible that the effort to enforce the law will arouse such resentment that the proportion of the population in its favor will be dissipated rather than enhanced. These proportionate figures are, of course, quite arbitrary. A good deal depends upon how fervently and stubbornly majorities and minorities hold to their position.

It would be quite wrong to draw the conclusion that only educational and religious influences upon moral and social standards are of avail, and that it must be regarded futile to change social structures and systems by legal pressure. Too often religious leaders draw this conclusion and assert that goodness by coercion is abortive. A considerable proportion of our social virtue is derived not from our own resources but from the restraints and influences of the community. But the most effective restraints are not those of pure law, particularly not if the law is in conflict with the "conscience" of the community.

In the case of the racial problem of the south it would have been much better to begin with anti-lynching and anti-poll tax legislation. The south has an uneasy conscience about the problems against which these laws are directed and the liberal portion of the south would have supported them. The conscience of the best people of the south would have converged with the conscience of the nation upon these issues. It was because it was felt that the fair employment bill had less chance of passing that President Truman was persuaded to place it first upon his program. Its proponents felt that it would not pass at all if it came last. It is now quite clear that it will not pass, first or last.

One might, as most liberals, nail the flag to the mast and fight on this issue without regard to immediate success or failure, if one could be certain that the law could be enforced, once passed. But a fair employment act requires, above all, a tremendous degree of community cooperation. In states in which it has been successful it has relied chiefly upon administrative procedures and persuasion and has availed itself as little as possible of sanctions. The more sanctions are used or threatened, the more voluntary cooperation vanishes. No type of legislation lends itself so easily to evasion.

In short, it is important in the field of political reality to be as wise as the serpent as well as to be as harmless as the dove. Politics is still the art of the possible. This remains true even when we deal with racial injustices which affront the conscience of the nation. Progress toward better race relations is still too slow in both north and south. But there is real progress. From the Christian viewpoint it is more important that the church of the south should give more solid proof that the Christian community is a community of grace, transcending race, than that the church of the north

hich is incidentally almost as completely egated as the southern church) should a purely legal solution for a deep al and spiritual problem.

Fifty-Fifty Split in Modern Culture

After its initial triumph five years ago the bor party in Britain was returned to ver with an insignificant majority. The jority is in fact so small that it will have y a short lease of power. The prospects that in another general election the con-vatives will come to power with an ally insignificant majority. This kind talemate has the peril of creating a gen- sense of futility.

The division of Britain into two almost al political halves is symptomatic of the ble of western civilization, including our country where the difference between ng strength of Republican and Demo-ic parties is about 6% of the total vote. Britain the overwhelming majority of r was whittled away by defections in middle classes. A sufficient number of dle class people, who had voted for r after the war, have returned to their e traditional allegiance to prevent the r party from being the instrument of hole community. In America the past tion, and probably the next, will be rmined by the way the farmers allocate r votes between the business party and labor (democratic) party. The Repub-ns are right: the democratic party is ming increasingly the labor party. John Strachey is right also in declaring our "Fair Deal" politics is more con-ntly devoted to the welfare state than of any government in Europe outside Britain. Let Mr. John T. Flynn make most of that. Mr. Strachey, whom erican conservatives still brand as a com-nist, is incidentally much shrewder than e of his comrades on the left in Britain. British left, insofar as the voice of the *Statesman and Nation* is typical of its ion, still likes to picture America as a erness of free enterprise, with a political ality which is almost as abhorrent to good British socialists as Russian communism. This leftist opinion is filled with self-pity over the necessity of choosing between two such impossible alternatives.

Actually we are similar to all western European nations in the fifty-fifty split in our moral and political opinions. The shading on the right and on the left varies in different countries. But the proportion is almost identical. The "class war" has shaken down to this curious situation. Quite obviously industrial labor alone is not powerful enough in any nation to be a consistently dominant force, though it is strong enough to be the striking force of the left. The business community is the striking force of the right. The farmers and various professional and other middle class groups are about equally divided in their allegiance.

In a really healthy society this situation need not be too dangerous. But none of our national communities is too healthy. Therefore the situation is fraught with some danger. It is particularly dangerous if the two groups drift farther and farther apart in their social policies. One interesting aspect of the American situation is that without a class conflict on the traditional European lines and without an explicit Marxist rebellion against a bourgeois culture we should be "falling apart" on lines almost identical with those of Europe. The reactions to Senator McCarthy's politics are an interesting indication of these two Americas. "Liberal" America reacted to McCarthy with disgust, dismay, and anger. Conservative America hoped against hope that McCarthy might be able to get some of the mud which he slings so indiscriminately to stick. There is little middle ground between this hysterical type of conservatism and American liberal opinion.

The Spirit of Justice

In the Christian faith the final law in which all other law is fulfilled is the law of love. But this law does not abrogate the laws of justice, except as love rises above

justice to exceed its demands. The ordinary affairs of the community, the structures of politics and economics, must be governed by the spirit of justice and by specific and detailed definitions of rights and duties.

American Christianity tends to be irrelevant to the problems of justice because it persists in presenting the law of love as a simple solution for every communal problem. It is significant that the "social Gospel," which sought to overcome the excessive individualism of the Christian faith in America, never escaped this sentimentality and irrelevance because it also preached the same ethic which it pretended to criticise. It insisted that Christians should practice the law of love not only in personal relations but in the collective relations of mankind. In these relations love as an ecstatic impulse of self-giving is practically impossible. Nations, classes, and races do not love one another. They *may* have a high sense of obligation to one another. They must express this sense of obligation in the desire to give each one his due.

The effort to substitute the law of love for the spirit of justice instead of recognizing love as the fulfillment and highest form of the spirit of justice, is derived from the failure to measure the power and persistance of self-interest. It is because self-interest is not easily overcome in even the life of the "redeemed" that most of the harmonies of life are not the perfect harmonies of fully coordinated wills but the tolerable harmonies of balanced interests and mutually recognized claims. Even in the family, in which the spirit of love may prevail more than in any other human institution, the careful calculation of rights is an important element in the harmony of the whole, though it must be observed that rights are so complexly intertwined in intimate relations that the calculations of justice lead to friction if love is not constantly infused into them.

Christians pride themselves upon an ethic which exceeds the requirements of law. But it is significant that Jews, schooled in their legalistic tradition and also the inheritor of the prophetic spirit, are on the whol more adept in the field of justice thar Christians. They might well say to Chris tians what Cosimo d'Medici said to Catho lics in the Renaissance: "You have buil your ladders into the heavens. We wil not seek so high nor sink so low." Christia business men are more frequently character ized by a spirit of philanthropy than by spirit of justice in assessing the claims an counterclaims of economic groups. Lov in the form of philanthropy is, in fact, o a lower level than a high form of justice For philanthropy is given to those wh make no claims against us, who do no challenge our goodness or disinterestedness An act of philanthropy may thus be an ex pression of both power and moral com placency. An act of justice on the othe hand requires the humble recognition tha the claim which another makes against u may be legitimate.

The pronouncements of church bodie and the preachments of the pulpit still ten to smell of sentimentality in our day be cause the law of love is presented withou reference to the power of the law of sel love. "All coercion," wrote a Christia business man recently, "is foreign to th Christian life because we Christians kno that only uncoerced goodness is real goo ness." This does not take into account tha we need a great deal of second-rate goodne to get along with one another. We hav to have a taxation system which demand more of us than we are inclined to giv voluntarily; and we must maintain a soci security system which holds us responsibl for the security of other families than ou own beyond our natural inclination. W can not preserve the health of the free wor without American aid to other natio which must go far beyond the utmost limi of voluntary philanthropy.

Our Position in Asia

It is rather sad that the tumult and d traction occasioned by Senator McCarth irresponsible charges against the State D

tment should have diverted the mind
conscience of the nation and the gov-
ment from a much more serious problem
Asia. That problem consists in the
tradiction in which we are involved in
policies in China on the one hand and
Indo-China on the other.

n China we have at long last refused to
rifice any more American prestige by
porting a government which had long
e lost the respect of the Chinese people.
one will pretend that the communist
ture of the revolutionary forces of China
ood either for us or for the peace of the
ld. Our action in China, despite the
erical reaction of American conserva-
s to it, gives us a chance to refute the
ely held impression in Asia that we sup-
t imperialistic and reactionary govern-
ts against the natural desire for freedom
siatic and African peoples. We can not
rd to allow communism to exploit na-
alism in Asia for its own ends. But if
are to stop it we must prove ourselves
friend and supporter of justified na-
al aspirations. This has been the con-
nt thesis of our Ambassador to China,
Leighton Stuart. Admittedly very con-
rable risks are involved in such a policy.
possible that the communists may suc-
in fastening their hold upon China so
tly that nothing but a world conflict
finally dislodge them. But the risk
to be assumed because the alternative
s of offending the national aspirations
e whole of Asia are greater.

ut what shall one make of a policy which
tralizes whatever virtue we may have
eved in China by supporting the French
pet government of Bao Dai in Indo-
na? Of course the alternative in
o-China is also a communist govern-
t, though one which has more impulses
rd Titoism in it than the Mao govern-
t of China. Ambassador Jessup argues
the Bao Dai government holds greater
mise of becoming a viable regime than
Formosa outfit. But that is to damn with
faint praise. We have succeeded in
ng some of our aid directly to the gov-
ernment rather than to its French masters. But it is no secret that French pressure forced us into this position; and that the reputation of the Bao Dai regime as a French stooge militates against its success and against our prestige. We have given the communists in Asia another propaganda weapon.

This curious inconsistency arises partly from the fact that we must play politics not only in Asia but also in Europe. We must try to keep the French happy as well as our Asiatic friends. But there are limits to this kind of compliance. Many good people fear that American power is so great that it will be exercised ruthlessly. But there is another danger. That is that we will not exercise it consistently enough. In ordinary affairs executives who try to be all things to all men usually spread chaos about them. We are in a similar danger as a nation. Statesmanship can not be exercised without a considerable degree of circumspection. But circumspection without boldness ends in futility. The inconsistencies of our Asiatic policy have brought us close to complete futility. If there is any virtue in a firm opposition to communism all along the line, we have lost it in China. If there is any virtue in allowing the vast revolutionary forces in Asia to find their own level we have lost it in Indo-China.

The Simplified Goal

The question most frequently asked by inquiring young idealists of their religious leaders is whether it would not be possible to secure something like the same fanatic devotion for the Christian faith as the communists betray. The same question was asked a decade ago with Nazism as the point of comparison.

The question reveals an acute awareness of the lack of any real sense of direction in the so-called "free world" in general and in the Christian part of the world in particular. A free society is not moving in any particular direction but is content to allow various forces, economic, political, cultural,

and religious to express themselves, partly in harmony with, and partly in contradiction to each other. Protestant Christianity is in the same situation. Despite the progress of the ecumenical movement there is little sense of a common purpose and frequently not even of a common Gospel in the diverse sects of Protestantism.

We need a new and unifying impetus in Protestant Christianity. But it must be made clear that the fanatic zeal of the political religions is neither possible nor desirable from the Christian standpoint. It is not desirable because the fanaticism endows some particular political goal with absolute worth and sacrifices every other value to it. We are hardly consistent if we abhor the cruelties which spring from this fanaticism on the one hand, and yearn for the force of the fanaticism on the other hand. Furthermore the fanaticism is not possible in Christian terms. Idolatrous religions inevitably create a political phalanx of remarkable unity, compared with a religion which does not invest any political program with absolute worth. The power of idolatrous religion is created by the seduction of the worship of self rather than the worship of God. Idolatrous religions usually glorify the collective self and give the individual self a sense of enlargement and redemption from narrowness on the one hand, and a sense of its glorification through the collective self on the other hand. This is a nice way of eating one's cake and having it too. It accounts for the power of idolatrous religion and also for its destructiveness.

In the case of communism the idolatry is more plausible than that of Nazism because the universal value of a "classless society" hides the self-glorification of the proletarian class, and of Russia as the fatherland of the revolution. In Nazism collective self-glorification was completely naked and unashamed. For this reason communism is more dangerous and has a more universal appeal than Nazism.

The Christian faith, on the other hand, subjects men and nations to the judgment of God's majesty and promises them nothing except on the other side of their dying with Christ. The true life, the new life in Christ, is a resurrection which presupposes a previous destruction of the old self. There is nothing in this faith which enhances the pride of a nation, the security of a culture, the self-esteem of a civilization, or the moral complacency of an individual. Movements such as "Spiritual Mobilization" may try to link the Gospel with the pride of a "free enterprise system" or the "American way of life." The "Christopher" movement, now flourishing in the Catholic church where it partly emulates Buchmanism in the Protestant church, may give the "good people" the complacent assurance that all the evil in the world is derived from the vice of "1% of the population." These movements contain a good deal of the idolatry which they profess to abhor in communism. They also draw some strength from over-simplifying the goals of life in a complex world. The sense of being lost in a bewildering historical situation makes any religious movement with simple goals attractive. But such movements have little to do with any genuine Christian redemption.

Even those forms of Christian faith which become desperate about saving democracy or western civilization or any other value of history quickly degenerate into indolatry because they debase the faith into an instrument of this or that historic value. Thereby it ceases to be an apprehension of the majesty and mercy of the divine Creator and Redeemer. It is difficult not to be concerned about the state of our world. But Christian renaissance is not achieved by such anxiety. The quality of life in our so-called Christian world depends upon the unsung life of faith and love of millions of humble Christian pastors and people. It depends upon the humility, charity, and serenity, the "love, joy, and peace" which flow from a genuine intimacy with Christ. It depends too upon social and

ernational attitudes in which true grace luiced out from individual life into the ler relationships of mankind. Thus, for ance, the effectiveness of American leadhip in the so-called free world depends upon frantic appeals to our sense of oral leadership" than upon a religious se of humility which will make it pose for a very powerful and very fortunate nation to establish tolerably decent relations to an impoverished world.

We could do with more unity and more sense of direction. But we need a vital Christian life, acting as a leaven in all human relations, more than any new organization or specific impetus prompted by immediate tasks and perils.

CONTRIBUTORS

aul Lehmann is Professor of Christian ics at Princeton Seminary, Princeton, w Jersey.

ichard M. Fagley is co-secretary of the mmission on Justice in International Reons of the Federal Council of Churches hrist in America.

dward LeRoy Long, Jr. is a graduate ient at Columbia University, New York, is the author of two recent books, *nce and Christian Faith,* and *The istian Response to the Atomic Crisis.*

ohn Hutchison is Professor of Religion Williams College, Williamstown, Massasetts.

Will Herberg is on the research staff of I.L.G.W.U. and devotes most of his aining time to free-lance journalism to lecturing on theology and ethics.

Richard W. Day is on the faculty of Hobart College, Geneva, New York.

William J. Wolf is on the faculty of the Episcopal Theological Seminary, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Roger L. Shinn is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religion at Heidelberg College, Tiffin, Ohio.

William G. Webber is Dean of Students at Union Theological Seminary, New York, and has been intimately connected with the East Harlem Protestant Parish as one of its initiators.

Winnifred Wygal was an executive of the national Y.W.C.A. before her retirement. She now lives near Union Theological Seminary in New York.

WHAT IS RELIGIOUS LIBERTY?
DEFINITIONS AND PRESUPPOSITIONS

By PAUL LEHMANN

It has become axiomatic that the chief Protestant contribution to religious liberty is the assertion of the liberty of conscience. This liberty is usually derived from individual as against ecclesiastical priesthood, from direct and private as against ecclesiastically mediated access to God.

The conscience of the individual is divinely sanctioned as the ultimate authority in matters of faith and conduct. Wherefore any trespass upon this liberty of conscience, whether by other individuals or by social or religious institutions, is a violation of religious liberty. Indeed, the integrity of a community or an institution is ultimately measured by the respect for and preservation of the liberty of conscience. The liberty of conscience and religious liberty are identical.

There is some truth in this position. The Reformation did rescue the individual from institutional domination. The Reformation rightly grasped the fact that conscience is a religious and not a moral function of human nature. It therefore rightly insisted that conscience is superior to law and to society, for if law, whether Divine or natural or positive—if law be the key to human dignity, the man for whom Christ died and whom God made in His own image is buried beneath a cumulative mass of precept and tradition, and finally destroyed.

Unless conscience be the boundary of community, there is no check against the tyranny and idolatry inherent in the dynamics of group behavior and latent in every social structure from the family to the Church.

EDITOR'S NOTE: This is a transcription of an address given at the Chicago Institute for Religious and Social Studies, Hotel Bismarck, Chicago, Illinois, November 8, 1949.

Social idolatry is manifest whenever a social pattern or institution is effectively removed from the criticism of conscience by the insistence that it is either divinely ordained or self-justified. The tyranny in such idolatry varies with the kind and degree of power possessed and the occasions calling for its exercise. A holy people, or a holy church, is susceptible of this idolatry in a particularly virulent way because criticism can then be put down or put aside as blasphemy and the conscience can be overruled by the pneuma.

A good conscience, however, which Calvin has nicely defined as no other than inward integrity of heart—a good conscience knows where to draw the line, and such a conscience is eternally vigilant of its liberty in a world where such idolatry continues to be practiced.

Nevertheless, the axiomatic identification of religious liberty with liberty of conscience does not exhaust the Protestant understanding and interpretation of the matter. Indeed, it is a bare and unstable minimum. On the record, the Hebrew and Roman Catholic traditions in their bearing upon religious liberty have had no monopoly of error and shortcoming. The Genevan theocracy demonstrated that a divinely sanctioned magistracy is no guarantee of religious liberty, and only slightly more congenial to the liberty of conscience than a divinely sanctioned hierarchy. Presbyterians still have to suppress an over-ready impulse to run to the secular arm to establish the consciences of other men in a readier conformity with the freedom of their own.

If the Protestant contribution to religious liberty is solely or even chiefly the affirmation of the liberty of conscience, it is hard

e how we shall explain to those who
from us the two unhappy dilemmas
which our consciences have been
led.

ıe first of these dilemmas is that be-
ı legalism and quietism. The second
ıt between utopianism and secularism.
lism is the attempt to express by law
the conscience requires. It seeks to
ome the gap between the conscience
its environment by regulation. Quiet-
s the attempt of the conscience to come
ace with itself in an uncongenial en-
ment by narrowing the range of its
s to those which are obviously religious
personal. If legalism expresses its
ty of conscience in an excess of zeal
rds the world, quietism too hastily
dons the world for the sake of the free-
of conscience.

galism, as is well known, has been the
ular parallel of the Calvinistic line
e Reformation; Quietism of the Lu-
n line. The dilemma between utopian-
and secularism cuts across these
ssional lines and may be said to
ge from the inner tension in Protes-
m as a whole. Utopianism is the at-
t to express the liberty of conscience in
vorld by carving out an island, so to
of religious freedom and purity in a
f compromise and of false and com-
g authorities. It does not seek to
rm the world, the environment, to
the conscience requires, but instead
rmeate the environment by the in-
t persuasiveness of its own perfections.

ularism, from the point of view of this
em, may be regarded as the attempt
end the range of freedom in the world
e combined convictions and vitality of
ovements which seek to turn back the
ers of authority in the name of liberty.
ty of conscience, on this basis, acquires
er than religious foundation. Religi-
nd non-religious views of liberty blend
common enterprise on behalf of men
iety.

Now we Protestants must admit, I think, that the more distant the origins of the Reformation have become and the more complex our life, the more we have lost confidence in the alternative between legalism and quietism. At the same time we have fallen more and more into the alternative between utopianism and secularism. Most of us think and talk as though the Four Freedoms were all on a par, as though religious liberty and democracy were the two sides of the common coin of freedom in the modern world, and if we are really pressed to define religious liberty, we fall back either upon a state of things in which there is no interference with the institutional life of the church, or upon the vague expectation that all peoples will one day see that where there is no vision of God, the people perish.

Now it may be that in practice there is no way out of these dilemmas. We are met, however, today to consider religious liberty in the area not of practice but of thought. I should like therefore to suggest that Protestants may derive some relief from the dilemmas of their consciences by taking up a distinction implicit in the thought of the Reformers and exploring it more adequately than the Reformers did.

If ideas do have consequences, the whole question of religious liberty may thereby be clarified and the heritage of liberty secured. The distinction to which I refer is that between religious freedom and religious liberty. This distinction is indicated in Luther's thought, for instance, by the fact that the decisive year, 1520, saw the publication not only of the Address to the German Nobility, but also of the Freedom of the Christian Man. Calvin's discussion of the Conscience is the third part of his discussion of what he calls Christian liberty.

It is not unimportant that the first part of Christian liberty, according to Calvin, has to do with justification by faith, nor is it accidental that the whole question of Christian liberty is set by Calvin not in the

discussion of God the Creator, but in the context of his Christology. This means, of course, that the basis of religious liberty is not at all the relation of man to God the Creator, but the relation of man to God the Redeemer.

It means also that when the Reformers fell back upon natural law, as they tried to bring their discovery about freedom to bear upon the life in this world, they were children of their time. We cannot follow them in their lapse, but we must follow them in the light which they shed upon the meaning and presuppositions of religious liberty.

My thesis then is this: The axiomatic identification of religious liberty with the liberty of conscience is misleading and not the fundamental Protestant contribution to the understanding of religious liberty. Only when the nature and presuppositions of religious freedom are understood and accepted can religious liberty be meaningful and secure.

Here, I think, is the distinctively Protestant contribution to thought about religious liberty. Apart from this contribution, it is impossible to preserve religious liberty from being undermined by the idolatrous pretensions of Catholicism on the one hand and by the ambiguities of secularization on the other.

Religious freedom is the condition of human existence in which man actually is himself in being related. Freedom is thus not one dignity among others which comprise man's uniqueness as a discrete being. Freedom is the sine qua non of our humanity.

Let me try to make the matter concrete in this way. You and I speak of ourselves as living in the world. Now the world in this sense is the whole complex of relationships in which we discover and express our humanity. Insofar as we really can be and are ourselves in these relationships, we are free. But we know, of course, that this is just the problem. We are seldom, if ever, ourselves in being related. There is always the weather or some virus, the boss or the wife or just plain Monday morning with which we are inescapably related, but which are so many occasions for being other than we are. This being at home in the world, at home with all that we who are not at home in the world know that we would be if we were, this is freedom.

Now, this freedom is religious, because it presupposes that man can only be himself like that, insofar as he is related in a particular way to a particular kind of God. This God is one to whom the conditions of human existence make a difference. He is a God without whom the conditions of human existence enslave man rather than set him free. This God is a God whose personal self-giving is the ground and the occasion for man's existence and destiny as a person.

The freedom of which we are speaking is religious, because it presupposes further that man has no power in himself by which he could be free. It is rather that man is free insofar as God gives him freedom and acts to set him free. The fact that the fulfillment of freedom follows upon the deliverance from bondage—this fact requires a Christological rather than a creationist understanding of human freedom.

Freedom is not a dignity of man because he is made in the image of God. It is a gift to man in Christ, because in Christ man has been set free from the law of sin and death. Man is free always and only by grace alone, by faith alone; "ubi et quanquo viso es deo," never "ex opere operato."

Religious liberty, on the other hand, is the exercise of man's religiously grounded freedom. This exercise includes the honoring of God in worship, in integrity of heart, in obedience—all these always in conformity with the freedom of man for whom Christ died and rose again. It is because religious liberty is grounded in religious freedom that the exercise of religious lib

is the boundary beyond which no per-
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domless crusade for religious liberty against an ominous secular threat. Protestants with a sure grasp of the true ground of religious liberty know that the real menace of the secular totalitarianism of our time is not its outspoken Godlessness, but its subtle and systematic annihilation of the freedom which alone stands between humanity as human and mankind as a mass.

And finally, these definitions explain why Protestantism can be said to be the perennial bulwark of religious liberty. Protestantism is the expression of the fact that man's freedom is his humanity because that freedom springs from the unrivaled freedom wherewith God made the world and reconciled it unto Himself.

ATOMIC CRISIS: SECOND PHASE

By RICHARD M. FAGLE

The successful detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb, and the consequent breakdown of negotiations to bring such weapons under international control, involve us in the painful necessity to take stock of the new situation and the events which led up to it. Several hopes and illusions have been punctured by the hard facts of the past five years. If churchmen are to exert a more telling influence on the succeeding stages of this unfolding crisis, we need to examine these facts and assess their implications. This is an elementary responsibility for Christian strategy.

I.

Perhaps the most significant revelation of the first phase of the atomic crisis has concerned the gulf which divides the Western states from the Soviet regime. When the Western governments proposed negotiations on a plan for international control, it was widely assumed that a common fear of atomic destruction would help to establish a community of interest in the effective outlawry of atomic weapons. In the negotiations, however, fears of mutual destruction played a minor role as compared with the concrete and contradictory fears which stood in the way of agreement. The Western powers evidenced fear of Soviet aggression, and of Soviet evasion under any loose or incomplete system of control. The Soviet leaders expressed fear of eventual attack by the West, and particular apprehension over possible Western penetration and interference with Soviet military, economic, and political institutions by means of a strict atomic control mechanism.

Again, it was hoped that the common though unequal sacrifices of the war, the victory over common foes, and the pledges of common efforts for peace expressed in the United Nations Charter, would provide the necessary foundation for cooperatio in the atomic field. As Wendell Wilkie an others had pointed out, there was a pro found longing in the hearts of the Russia as well as Western peoples for peace an rebuilding and fellowship. Such mutua sentiments were foundations, many felt, o which to construct the measures require to establish the sovereignty of mankind ove weapons of mass destruction.

A significant indication that these hope would likewise prove illusory was Stalin address of February, 1946, four months b fore the U. N. Atomic Energy Commissio held its first meeting. In this addres Stalin reverted to the thesis of the inevit bility of war between the two worlds, stres ing the continuing perils to the Sovi regime from the capitalist powers and th pressing need of the Soviet peoples to mak additional heavy sacrifices for military bud gets. Some at the time interpreted th speech as a device to whip up the patriotis required for the new five-year plan, th costly rebuilding of heavy industry d stroyed by the Nazi invasion. Such a pu pose may well have been a factor. But th subsequent evidence reinforces the jud ment that the Politburo has held co sistently to the dogma that peace betwee the Soviet and Western worlds is at be temporary, and that soon or late the ca italist powers will be driven by the "inn contradictions" of their social order to a tempt an attack on the Soviet land.

In fact, the evidence accumulates that th men in the Kremlin have become prisone of their own "infallible" doctrine. As th regime has grown older, less fertile in idea more rigid in structure, less flexible tactics, it has eliminated, except possibly the Politburo level, and perhaps even the those independent minds whose critic analysis was able in earlier stages of t

olution to bring about reexamination revision of theory in the light of the rd facts" which Lenin used to stress. party congress has been held for more n a decade. The person and writings Stalin have been canonized in the care- y rewritten "histories". The scientists, ters, and artists are compelled to kow- to lesser dogmas handed down from the emlin. Those who retain some of the lier internationalism are branded as smopolitans." Those satellites who, like o, attempt to assume some initiative in olying Marxist principles to native con- ons become "fascist dogs." The diseases old age are clearly visible.

Consequently, there seems little ground the belief that the present ideological f between the two worlds might some- y be bridged by new negotiations. The or church pronouncements, issued since search for a hydrogen bomb was pub- y announced, have all stressed the need a new effort to secure agreement on ing the tragic deadlock over atomic and ted matters. The Executive Committee he World Council of Churches in Feb- ry called for a "gigantic new effort for ce" and urged "the governments to enter negotiations once again." The plea supported by the Federal Council of urches in March, when trust was ex- ssed "that our government will continue give careful consideration to every pos- e avenue to trustworthy agreement on mic energy and related issues, preferably ough the United Nations." Similarly, British Council of Churches in April ssed the need for reconsideration of h the majority and minority plans for rnational control of atomic energy, and ed the British government to take the iative in promoting "renewed interna- al consultation."

These things must, of course, be said. ry possible opportunity to discuss the blem of controlling the atom must be ed, in the hope of clarifying the various tions, of exploring new formulas for ptable compromise, of keeping the channels of communication open. Churchmen can never accept the fatalistic notion of an unbridgeable chasm between the Soviet and Western worlds.

At the same time, it would be an error, in my judgment, if we were to rest our hopes for curbing the race in atomic weapons chiefly in the procedures of negotiation, at any diplomatic level. The problem lies deeper than misunderstanding of the facts or the clash of national interests. The problem essentially is a religious problem, a difference in basic beliefs about moral values and human destiny. It is the want of a common international ethos, as the Bishop of Chichester has argued, that lies at the root of the deadlock. There is lacking a common foundation of moral principles broad and strong enough to enable the majority to trust in the good faith of the minority unless it were buttressed with trustworthy guarantees, such as thorough supervision and inspection; or to enable the minority to trust in the pledges of the majority not to misuse its power to undermine the Soviet regime, if the majority control plan were put into effect.

This has been the central problem since the beginning of the negotiations. Indeed, the three years of extended discussions in the U. N. Atomic Energy Commission can hardly be deemed negotiations without stretching the normal meaning of that term. The records of the Commission show that after the first meetings, when Soviet scientists who contributed to the preliminary scientific report were recalled, there were virtually no candid discussions between the Soviet and Western representatives. The Soviet delegates were so limited in their authority that they could hardly comment on the weather without fresh instructions from Moscow. It would take weeks to secure a clarification of some formal proposal from the Soviet side, and usually invective was made to serve in place of clarifying definitions. So much attention was devoted by the Soviet spokesmen to impugning the good faith of the non-Soviet countries, that one is entitled to reasonable doubt that the

Kremlin took very seriously its own proposals for outlawing atomic weapons which relied so heavily on good faith as their principal sanction.

This is not to say that the majority plan, refined by the non-Soviet delegates over the course of the negotiations, was not without weaknesses. The provision for carefully worked out stages of transition from national to international control, for example, was based on the assumption that the transition would take place during the period of American monopoly of atomic weapons. While this aspect of the majority plan was not discussed in detail in the Commission, it was one of the features found objectionable by the Soviet authorities, as part of a "plot" to perpetuate the U. S. monopoly. Since President Truman's announcement concerning the atomic explosion in Russia, the obsolete character of this provision has been pointed out by Mr. Chester Barnard, a member of the Board which prepared the original U. S. proposals. A more rapid transition than was then envisaged is seen as desirable.

It should also be remembered that many complicated problems of the majority control plan were never considered by the Atomic Energy Commission, because of the major disagreement over elementary principles. These complex issues included the composition and voting procedure of the proposed international authority, the international distribution of its plants and stockpiles, the quotas to be allotted the various countries, and the financial arrangements. These questions involve not only delicate strategic issues, affecting the world balance of power, but also the "vested interests" of national atomic authorities established in a growing number of countries. For that matter, it cannot be assumed that the U. S. Senate would ratify a treaty which entailed the ultimate or proximate destruction of a good part of the plants on which several billions of dollars have already been spent. The majority plan, as endorsed by the U. N. General Assembly, is far from complete.

As the British Council of Churches said in its recent statement, the majority and minority plans need reconsideration in the light of the changed situation produced by the Soviet development of atomic weapons and the search for hydrogen bombs. In particular, the Western governments ought to study anew the minimal requirements of a control plan more acceptable than the present unrestricted armaments race. For example, if the agreement included a provision to restrict all uranium production to minimal quotas during the period of experimentation on the harnessing of nuclear fuels for power, it might be feasible to postpone international ownership of such fuels during the interim, relying on international inspection alone to provide warning of violations. A fresh examination of such questions is desirable, to see whether a technically acceptable plan of control can be made to fit the political and strategic facts now evident. President Truman's brief reference to a fresh start in the search for adequate and acceptable methods of international control is to be welcomed from this point of view.

It would be a mistake, however, to pin too many hopes on any such reappraisal. In the first place, the main bone of contention is not likely to be affected. This is the question of thorough and continuous inspection by international personnel. It might be possible to provide reliable methods of warning about atomic violations without international ownership and management, although the technical problems would be much more difficult. But essentially unlimited and uninterrupted international inspection is essential to any warning system worthy of the name. Initial surveys to locate uranium ore deposits and all existing installations, continuous international supervision at operating plants, and the unhindered right to visit any area for possible clandestine activities, appear to be minimal technical requirements for the effective outlawry of atomic weapons. And to all three of these the Soviet leaders have been vehemently opposed.

The Soviet counter-proposals eventually ıcluded a provision for periodic interna- onal inspection of declared atomic instal- tions, with some vague reference to special ıvestigations elsewhere under certain mited circumstances. The Soviet delegate iled to explain how periodic inspections ould meet technical requirements for dequacy, or how undeclared installations ight be detected. The refusal of the oviet representative to explain, justify, or odify this technically inadequate proposal ould seem to indicate that the Kremlin, nable to design a workable alternative to ıe majority plan, was in effect rejecting ıternational inspection while appearing to eep Stalin's pledge in this regard.

Indeed, it is difficult to explain Soviet onduct in the Commission, except as tac- cs for temporizing during the period of merican monopoly. Successive counter- roposals would contain poorly-defined pro- isions, and weeks or months would be con- ımed in discussions to ascertain their ıeaning. Further proposals would renew ıe process, protracting the negotiations. 'his pattern was altered at the last session f the General Assembly, held some months fter the Soviets had begun to manufacture ıeir own bombs. In place of new conces- ons, Mr. Vishinsky withdrew an earlier oncession regarding quotas and asked the ssembly to condemn the U. S. and Britain or the stalemate, reject the six-power ne- otiations in advance, and endorse the oviet plan. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet elegate withdrew from the meetings of the onsoring powers, on the pretext of hinese Nationalist representation, so that ven the motions of negotiations came to a alt. The conclusion appears to be that ıe negotiations, which served a useful pur- ose while atomic installations were being uilt, are regarded by the Soviet leaders as o longer necessary or desirable.

This point of view is understandable. o matter how many safeguards were writ- n into an atomic treaty, the right of in- ection would have to be essentially unlimited to be trustworthy. No real dividing line could be drawn between atomic installations and secret installations of other types. All would have to be subject to inspection if there were to be general assurance against undetected violations. This requirement cuts directly across a central tenet of Soviet strategy, that secrecy is a major military and political asset. Furthermore, no matter how clearly the limitations on the powers of the international authority might be spelled out in the treaty, the agency to be workable, would have to have the power to deal with unforeseen situations. Such a grant of power would create the possibility that the majority might misuse that power to serve its own interests. Consequently, the Soviet Union, as the minority, would need to have more than its share of confidence in the good will and good faith of the majority. But, as pointed out earlier, this is precisely what the Soviet leadership, evidently committed to an increasingly rigid doctrine of inevitable hostility and war, does not have and cannot have without a profound change of heart.

These fundamental obstacles to agreement on the international control of atomic energy can hardly be overcome by enlarging the scope of the settlement sought. Combining atomic controls with the limitation of conventional armaments would considerably complicate the problems of inspection, not to mention the difficulty of finding an acceptable common denominator for land, air, and naval power. An inclusive approach to disarmament, moreover, would need to take into account the little-known bacteriological weapons, which do not appear to be adapted to an inspection type of control. Mr. Baruch was correct, I believe, in calling atomic controls the A in the alphabet.

As for Senator McMahon's proposal to combine atomic disarmament with a global economic and social development program, and various proposals to include an atomic treaty in a general peace settlement, there is undoubted need for careful consideration,

that no possible alternative to the present deadly competition be ignored. The McMahon proposal, if presented five years ago, when the Soviet Union was confronted with the terrific dual problem of reconstruction and atomic construction, would at least have had a better chance than today. It seems clear that the Soviet leadership, having solved successfully the most difficult phases of this dual problem, would be in no mood to pay much of a price for economic assistance now. Even at the close of the war, Stalin appeared to regard long-term American credits as more of a necessity for the American economy than for the Russian. Moreover, economic assistance to underdeveloped countries with non-communist governments offers no inducement to the Kremlin. Such aid is fundamentally counter-revolutionary as far as world communism is concerned.

The chances for any general peace settlement, in which atomic controls might be included, are far from bright. Soviet strategy and theory do take into account the possibility of periods of temporary and relative stability, during which settlements are necessary and useful for preparing to meet the next stage of overt conflict. The stabilization of Europe in the 1920's was recognized under this category, and contemporary Western Europe with Marshall aid may be so recognized. But the idea of a general, inclusive settlement seems foreign to Communist ideology. Lenin prepared the present leadership to deal with rival powers, to join with Germany at Rapallo against the former Allied Powers, with the latter at Geneva against Germany and Japan, and with Germany again at the outset of World War II. But he did not prepare the men of the Kremlin for a world of two super-powers, or for a general settlement between the Soviet Union and the non-Soviet world as a whole. Such a settlement would seem to run counter to the basic objective of keeping the "imperialist" powers divided, of utilizing the "contradictions" among them.

Certainly, so long as there is a possibility of exploiting divisions among the non-Communist states, the assumption must be that this familiar strategy will be followed. Only as the free societies build "situations of strength," particularly in the economic and social realm, so that the bonds of unity become progressively stronger, will the conditions for a change in Soviet strategy become more favorable. Even so, a series of separate partial agreements is much easier to envisage than an over-all settlement.

Turn as we will, the obstacles to any effective international system for controlling the atom appear presently insuperable, requiring a major transformation in attitudes and a rebirth of international confidence as necessary pre-conditions of agreement. As the Federal Council of Churches stated in September, 1945, the most favorable period for achieving a single world control was "the short period while the United States alone possesses atomic bombs." In this second phase of the atomic crisis, we must reckon the achievement of this objective as highly improbable, if not impossible. Christian strategy in this field must assume growing stockpiles of atomic bombs and in all likelihood, within a few years, of hydrogen bombs as well.

II.

The dwindling prospects for international atomic controls, together with the probable development of hydrogen bombs with indefinitely greater potentialities for mass destruction, give new urgency to the moral issues involved in the preparation and use of such weapons. For the non-pacifist Christian, at least, the moral perplexities are enormous. Bishop Dun, in describing the task of the Commission of Christian Scholars to study the moral implications of obliteration bombing and the military use of weapons of mass destruction, spoke of an "assignment in which failure is *almost* certain," of entering into "a dark cavern of perplexities in the hope

of finding some light which can guide us and our fellows."

The initial issue is whether a free society should undertake to construct weapons of mass destruction. The particular and present form of this question is whether this country should build hydrogen bombs, if their construction proves feasible. It can be argued that if H-bombs are made, the overwhelming probability is that they will be used, and if they are used, the overwhelming probability is that they will be used against great centers of population. Past experience reinforces this view. Indeed it seems to me likely that an unspoken, perhaps unrecognized, factor that entered into the decision to use atomic bombs against Japan, was the subconscious desire to justify a project on which two billion dollars had been spent.

Again, the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction, is a corrosive influence in a democracy. It tends to concentrate power and extend the limits of secrecy and regimentation, in preparation for "push-button" warfare. An eminent general has described the new weapons as the climax in the trend of development of military weapons, giving more and more power to the few over the many. And it was Mr. Lilienthal who stated, that if he had to choose between democratic freedoms and a little more security through atomic preparedness, "let the bombs fall."

Moreover, to oppose the construction of H-bombs as contrary to moral principles offers a clear-cut position, which avoids some of the difficult relative judgments. A prominent layman, in our Federal Council discussions, felt that this position for the Church was preferable to involvement in the complexities involved in the possible use of such a weapon. Yet it is not the weapon which raises the moral problems. Destructive power in itself is neither good nor evil. It is the purpose for which it is used and the manner in which it is used which determines the moral character of the deed.

In favor of constructing atomic weapons is the argument that the free societies must not be left defenseless before a possible aggression with similar weapons. As Dr. Bethe and the other eleven scientists said in their statement, "There can be only one justification for our development of the hydrogen bomb, and that is to prevent its use." The threat of retaliation is the main, if not the only, sanction now available to discourage a potential aggressor from using weapons of mass destruction. It is argued further, that the more decisive the weapon, the more important that effective means of retaliation be available. Otherwise, the inducement to and possibility of international blackmail and tyranny are enormously enhanced.

A subsidiary issue here is whether hydrogen bombs are needed in addition to uranium and plutonium bombs as possible deterrents to atomic attacks. A-bombs, said to be six times as powerful as the bombs used against Japan, constitute a fearful destructive threat. A handful at most would paralyze the largest metropolis. H-bombs, if possible at all, can be built to destroy a great metropolitan area, or even the greater part of a populous nation. Here indeed would be total war. Can the threat of total war be justified as a deterrent to total attack?

The difficulties in either answer to this question are matched by those involved in the question: Under what conditions, if any, would the actual use of atomic weapons be justified? Most churchmen, I believe, would join in the judgment that the United States should not be the first to use the hydrogen bomb, although they are divided as to whether the United States was wrong in first using atomic bombs, under the given circumstances. This illustrates how much easier it is to set forth a general principle than to apply it to concrete conditions. Unforeseen circumstances, such as an attack with germ warfare comparable in lethal qualities to H-bombs, might well modify any such principle.

Some would argue, as did one scientist in private conversation, "The Church must draw a line somewhere; the H-bomb is the last opportunity to do so." Others would oppose the idea of setting such bombs in a category separate from block-busters, fire-bombs, and jellied gasolene, which when used in sufficient quantity, can turn a great city like Tokyo or Dresden into a horrible inferno. They would point out, furthermore, that legitimate targets can be envisaged for fission and even fusion bombs, such as a naval fleet, or central army headquarters.

Perhaps the most urgent immediate issues in this area concern the strategic plans being prepared in the Pentagon covering the use of atomic weapons in the growing stock-pile. The apparent fact, as the Federation of American Scientists have pointed out, is that military planning is now being based on atomic armaments. The argument is heard that a Soviet-Western war could not be won, without the use of strategic bombers carrying atomic war-heads to attack the centers of Russian military production. Are the churches prepared to acquiesce in a policy which makes weapons of mass destruction part of the regular arsenal of war? If not, are they prepared to acquiesce in a vastly expanded air program to meet the same need with conventional armaments?

Such are some of the problems posed by the second phase of the atomic crisis. Hardly any of the alternatives are morally tolerable. As the Commission of Christian Scholars confronts its task of trying to bring the mind of Christ to bear on the truly dreadful issues which confront us, one can readily join in Bishop Dun's plea, "Pray for us, that the God with whom all things are possible may grant us light even in this darkness."

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A NEW EMPHASIS IN PACIFIST THOUGHT

By EDWARD LE ROY LONG, Jr.

A representative group of North American Christians of pacifist persuasion met in Detroit last May. They sought to define their position soberly and to spell out its relationship to the Church and to the culture. The thought and spirit of this Conference moved on a very high level. It would, of course, be false to deny the heterogeneous character of the group, or the presence of a few fanatics—but no equally representative group holding any ethical position would have avoided such a situation. Reports of this Conference have been fair, in the main, but they have missed what this writer regards as one of the most interesting undercurrents of the Conference. There is a new strand in pacifist thought; it may be loosely called a "post-Niebuhrian pacifism."

This article is a brief communique telling of this new emphasis; it is not a detailed examination or criticism. By the term "post-Niebuhrian pacifism" is meant a pacifism which works within the presuppositions of an orthodox theological outlook. Such a pacifism has broken with the humanistic optimism often characteristic of pacifism. It has also broken with the pluralism that believes all religions are seeking the same ends and the same ethical goals, and are therefore simply to be amalgamated with each other into a world-wide unity. The new strand of pacifist thought of which we speak stoutly denies any perfectionistic claim. It understands that refusal to participate in war constitutes a sinful compromise. It understands that non-violence is power, and therefore full of historical corruption. This new type of thought is neither a this-worldly utopianism nor an other-worldly asceticism, and it acknowledges the ambiguity and sinfulness of the middle ground. It does not look forward to a political order without coercion or corruption, yet it feels that the instrumentalities of modern war can only express a type of coercion that is self-destructive to the point of absurdity.

The ablest expression of this type of thought was made at the conference by Dr. Culbert Rutenber of Eastern Baptist Seminary, who gave the main address on the theological basis of pacifism. His presentation started with love as God's activity in Christ—an activity coming to us as a demand for participation. This participation is a response of surrender without terminus or ending. "We love with the love wherewith we are loved." Yet, understanding that this ultimate ethic cannot be simply and directly expressed in political situations, Rutenber suggested its relationship to justice, fully acknowledging Niebuhr's contributions at this point. Pacifism, according to Rutenber, must at least be non-violent *resistance* rather than non-resistence which maintains the status quo. Rutenber admitted that non-violent resistance is a coercive compromise, but based his case upon the supreme ethical significance of *degrees*. As there is a difference of real significance between holding hands and adultery in the matter of sexual relations, so also in the matter of political struggle there is a difference between mass warfare and non-violent resistance. Rutenber acknowledged that the argument that war is justified as the best service of relative justice in a given situation is a truly persuasive one, and one in keeping with his own understanding that love is always compromised in historical situations. However, he pointed out that a tension must always be kept between love and justice, and he held that to participate in military service sunders the relation between the two because (1) it denies the right to protest in the name of love harsh excesses done

in the name of justice, and because (2) military warfare denies the opportunity to express love in the context of justice. (Rutenber's case hung on the difference between spanking a child with a "This-hurts-me-more-than-it-does you" and obliteration bombing.)

Rutenber then extended his treatment to point out that love is related to truth and to hope just as it is to justice. Love not directed by truth is sentimentality, since truth forces men to assess the real issues involved in a situation. Also, love has a duty to truth which sometimes takes precedence over its duty to justice, as Kierkegaard pointed out when he showed that Christ was crucified for the truth even though he thereby put guilt upon his crucifiers. The witness to the truth that love has the final claim upon men requires a hope which is eschatological. Rutenber saw that, eschatologically speaking, faithfulness to love (even in the proximate sense) is dependent upon belief in God's rule over historical consequences.

Thus Rutenber is clearly a vocational pacifist—not a vocational pacifist in the ascetic sense of withdrawal in order to avoid the tragic ambiguities of life, but in the sense of making a witness to the truth, not unaware of compromise, not denying historical responsibility, but cognizant that neither pacifism nor non-pacifism is a simply workable way to peace with justice, and convinced of the historical relevance of the final Christian value judgment that love is the law of life.

The findings of the Conference which gathered up the discussions following Rutenber's speech illustrate the fact that a great gulf existed between presentation and discussion. The discussion revealed much of the pluralistic-humanism which predominantly has backed the pacifist outlook in recent decades, and which is quick to assume that "pacifism is the way of love." Unlike Rutenber's presentation which we have used to illustrate the deeper level of pacifist thought, unlike several of the pre-Conference papers illustrating the same tendency, and unlike certain elements in the full Conference message,* the findings added little to pacifist apologetic.

When the Conference was ready to adopt the message it heard a report from the committee appointed to write the preliminary version. This version was a sober and theologically sound document, containing many of the orthodox elements we have noted above. This version was attacked on the floor by a group of staunch political pacifists. They felt it was too long (which it was) but more expressly too theological and too mild. The absolutists wanted to yell "fire." Consequently a press release, shorter and sharper in tone, was prepared, and much of the Conference publicity has come from this version of the message. Those interested in understanding some of the deeper levels of thought at Detroit will read the entire message, for it will commend itself to the theologically acute more readily than the press release which was intended as a supplement, not a substitute.

Pacifists and non-pacifists are separated by such sharp differences of final existential commitment that communication between them is often difficult, and it is at times marked by hasty caricatures and emotionally charged terminology. Perhaps the new emphasis in pacifist thought briefly sketched above will help to overcome the gulf. It has taken theology seriously, and while it may not commend itself to Christians of non-pacifist persuasion as grounds for a change in existential commitment, it does make clear that there is a level of pacifist thought that is working within a profound theological appreciation of the Christian faith.

* NOTE: The findings and the message are different documents.

A NOTE ON JESUS AND PLATO

By JOHN HUTCHISON

At the end of Book IX of Plato's *Repub-* Socrates speaks of the ideal city, saying:

"In heaven there is laid up a pattern of methinks, which he who desires may be- old, and beholding may set his own house order. But whether such an one exists ever will exist in fact is no matter, for will live after the manner of that city, aving nothing to do with any other." Republic, IX, 592)

It is instructive to compare these famous ords with some even better known ones, sus' words in the Lord's Prayer, "Thy ngdom come, thy will be done on earth it is in heaven." The similarity of the eas and attitudes expressed in these two otations has been a commonplace of eology and philosophy from the first ntury to the twentieth. In both cases ality is held to include a realm which nds above the flux of passing experience, e ideal city for Plato and the kingdom of od for Jesus. It is "above" in the sense having a status in reality independent human experience. Plato's ideas do not pend upon men for their being; Jesus' ngdom of God "is" in heaven, though it y not be on earth at all. The assertion such a transcendent reality leads both atonism and Christianity to a judgment the inadequacy of such philosophic views empiricism and materialism, just for the ason that such views do scant justice to is aspect of man's experience. Moreover, th Platonism and Christianity, each in own way, place a supreme value upon is transcendent reality. For each in its y, it becomes the guide and standard of man life.

The early church fathers were quick to te these similarities, and thus to seize on Platonism as a philosophic vehicle r the expression of Christian faith. This arriage between Platonism and Chris- nity, once consummated, has proved to be one of the most fruitful and enduring and resilient in intellectual history. To continue the metaphor, in the household thus created, thinkers from Justin Martyr and Origen to Paul Elmer Moore and Robert L. Calhoun have found a home for their souls.

But notwithstanding these wide areas of agreement, there are also some sharp differences between Jesus and Plato. They are brought to focus in the words about the ideal city, "But whether such an one exists or not or ever will exist is no matter. . ." Here the difference between Platonism and Christianity opens before us. One cannot imagine Jesus saying that whether the kingdom of God exists or will come to existence is no matter. On the one hand Platonism regards it as unimportant whether the transcendent reality gains application in actual experience, while on the other hand biblical faith finds the very meaning of life in seeking, in obedience to the absolute command of God, such application.

Why this profound difference in attitude? It is rooted in two different conceptions of the nature of man. For Plato man is a contemplative mind whose highest function is to be a spectator of all time and eternity. The highest fulfillment of human life is the enjoyment of that contemplation. Thus for all its moral insight, Platonism is basically an esthetic view of life. On the other hand, for the Bible in general and for Jesus in particular, man is not a spectator but an agent, free though creaturely, whose highest function is the faithful and active service of God.

The social basis of these ideas is not irrelevant. Plato was a Greek aristocrat for whom practical action was menial and slavish. This view was a luxury to which the biblical Hebrews never attained. For them moral action in the service of God remained fundamental. The Hebrews

could thus say (and really mean it as Aristotle never could) that the end of man is action.

This distinction between man as spectatorial subject (the viewpoint of the grandstand) and as active agent (the viewpoint of the playing field) manifests itself in many ways. It shows itself in the relative place that theory and practice occupy in human life. For Greek science and for Greek life generally, theory was a higher category, a judgment which modern science and modern culture generally have reversed. For us theory justifies itself as it offers effective guidance for action. Here is perhaps one of the subtlest and deepest influences of the Bible on our culture. And what is to the point here, it may be understood as a corollary of the biblical view that man stands ultimately on the playing field and not in the grandstand.

Again, Platonism and biblical Christianity differ in their estimate of matter. For the former, matter is an appearance, a shadow cast by true reality. This is, of course, a not unfamiliar view either in the Orient or the Occident. It is truly what one sees if he looks at life from the grandstands. But for the Bible, matter is never "mere," for the good reason that it is an encountered fact. In this precise sense the Bible is more materialistic than Platonism or any of its intellectual relatives. This difference manifests itself in contrasting ideas of salvation. For Platonism it consists in saving good spirit out of evil or unreal matter; for Christianity it consists in controlling material means for spiritual ends.

Still again, Platonism and biblical Christianity show deep ethical differences. For the former, ethics was essentially a bull-session about the good life. And one of the deepest frustrations of Greek life was the gap which yawned between moral theory and moral practice. For the Hebrews ethics was a cry of protest against injustice, injustice which was an affront to God. And it was action in obedience to God to establish justice on earth. Greek thought on this subject shows no parallel to the categorical "thou shalt" of Hebrew religion from Moses through the prophets to Jesus.

Finally, the most crucial difference between Plato and Jesus is their teaching about history. The *Republic* teaches the doctrine of history as repeating cycles of degeneration; and this may be taken as typical of Greek thought on this subject. In sharpest possible contrast, Jesus taught that history was affirmative, dynamic, and unique. It is affirmative because God is sovereign goodness; it is dynamic because God's will operates in history; it is unique because the Lord of history is one. We may call this the dramatic view of history, for history is here regarded as a single drama beginning with Creation and ending with Last Judgment, whose plot is set by the conflict of God with the evil of the world. As actors in the drama, our human part is adequately described by the words, "Thy kingdom come, thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." It would falsify the whole practical meaning of the Christian life, and the Christian life is essentially practical, to substitute for these the contrasting words of Plato.

BOOK REVIEWS

PATHS IN UTOPIA. *By Martin Buber.* New York: Macmillan Co. 1950. 152 pp.

In this book, the first presentation of his ocial philosophy to appear in English, Martin Buber attempts both a reinterpre- ation of the socialist tradition and a vin- ication of the "communitarian" idea. ike de Lubac in *The Un-Marxian Social- t,* Buber insists that we have a great deal f very realistic social wisdom to learn om the so-called "utopians." In "uto- ian" socialism he discerns two distinct lements—"schematic fiction" and "organic lanning"—the latter of which he affirms be thoroughly unutopian in the usual nse. On the other hand, Marxism, for ll its disavowal of utopian thinking, has s own strong utopian strain, as is evi- nced by its expectation of the "withering way" of the state and the establishment the Perfect Society *in history.* (To ring this point out, Buber quotes Hei- ann and Tillich.) Clearly, the familiar tchwords do not correspond to the facts, nd it is Buber's contention that they are ot very serviceable for an understanding socialist teaching.

The historical section of the book, in e course of which such figures as Saint- mon and Fourier, Proudhon and Owen, opotkin and Landauer, as well as Marx nd Lenin, are briefly but perceptively xamined, is but the framework for Buber's ain purpose—to establish the true mean- g of the socialist idea and to free it from e distortions and corruptions it has un- rgone in the past century. "The socialist ea," he tells us, "points of necessity to e organic construction of a new society t of little societies inwardly bound to- ther by a common life and common work, nd their associations." The "true" social- t society is thus really a *communitas mmunitatum,* a network of free com- unities united in free federation at the rious levels made necessary by the genu- ine requirements of life. Such a society can be built up, according to Buber, only by a process of "inner organic restructur- ing" within the existing order; the function of political revolution or large-scale insti- tutional change, he insists, is to release "the elements of the new society which have already developed within the womb of the old"—these "new elements" being primarily community settlements for collective pro- duction and living, such as now play an important part in the economy of the State of Israel. The reversal of the relation and the shift of emphasis to politics and the state Buber holds to be responsible for the monstrous perversion of the socialist idea in Soviet Russia today. "The essential point," he concludes in his very last para- graph "is to decide on the fundamentals: a restructuring of society as a league of leagues and a reduction of the state to its proper function, which is to maintain unity; or the devouring of an amorphous society by the omnipotent state: Socialist Pluralism or so-called Socialist Unitarianism."

We must be grateful for Buber's chal- lenge to the all-devouring omnicompetent state and for his emphasis on the principle of voluntary non-state association as the authentic texture of an organic society. This challenge and this emphasis are much needed today. Yet questions arise. Buber shows how the "communitarian" idea works out in a country like Palestine, where a new social structure had to be built from the bottom up. But he does little to suggest the relevance of this idea to an economy like ours, which is characterized by a vast organized structure at various stages of monopoly and social control. How are de- centralized, small-scale collectives—"smaller and ever smaller communities"—going to run the steel, aluminum, oil and auto- mobile industries? And are we to renounce large-scale institutional reform until we have built up such collectives in these fields?

Indeed, can "full cooperatives"—this is Buber's phrase for the highest type of co-operative associations for "common life and common work"—be built in such large-scale mass-production enterprises? It is important to have these questions answered if we are to understand the relevance of Buber's socialist idea to our own social reality.

It seems to me, too that Buber often tends to forget the limits of spontaneous freedom in social organization. He knows that "in all probability, there will never—so long as man is man—be freedom pure and simple, and there will be state, i.e., compulsion, for just so long." He assigns the state the task of "maintaining unity" and curbing the centrifugal forces of egoism, individual and collective. But he sees such coercion as largely external to the organic collective cells out of which the federative society is to be composed. He does not, it seems to me, appreciate sufficiently the fact that even this "organic" community could not maintain itself as a going concern without some form of coercion to keep sinful, self-centered men in line with community interest.

Finally, I do not think Buber does full justice to Marx and his "eschatological utopianism" in comparison with the very different utopianism of the so-called "utopian" socialists. "The vision of rightness in revelation," he says, "is realized in the picture of a perfect *time*—as *messianic eschatology;* the vision of rightness in the ideal is realized in the picture of a perfect *space*—as *utopia*. . . Eschatology insofar as it is prophetic, utopia insofar as it is philosophical, both have the character of realism" (my emphasis, W. H.). But time is not space: eschatology, in *time,* implies a creative, dynamic movement towards an "end" that is also fulfillment; utopia, in *space,* is static, visionary, "idealistic," almost inevitably caught up in idolatrous corruption and absolutization. What is Marx's secularization of Prophetic eschatology but a partial conversion of eschatology into utopia? For when, in an eschatology, the "end of time" is made a point *in* time, time is annulled and transformed into space, and utopia results. In Marx, the process is never complete, and an eschatological tension remains; to the utopians, even the best, this tension is intrinsically alien and their systems can never escape the closed circle of anti-historical self-absolutization. That is one reason why, despite everything and with proper qualification, Marx is still the better guide.

WILL HERBERG

SCIENCE AND CHRISTIAN FAITH: A STUDY IN PARTNERSHIP. *By Edward LeRoy Long, Jr.* Association Press: 1950. 125 pp. $1.75.

This book, like others in the Haddam House series, is aimed at the intellectual level of the college student. The author is a graduate of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and Union Seminary, so he knows scientific method at first hand as well as theology. In this connection it is interesting that he makes the statement that one learns more about the implications of scientific method in a theological seminary than in an engineering school because the latter is more concerned with concrete results. This points to one of the central issues discussed: that of the relation between technology and Christianity. It is related to a theoretical issue: the applicability of scientific method to all areas of life. This, it seems to this reviewer, is the central issue for college students today; and if there is still warfare of religion and science, the battleground is in the area now claimed by the social sciences and psychology rather than the area covered by the natural sciences.

Mr. Long recognizes this; but I do not think he is entirely clear on the matter. He makes an important distinction between skill and commitment, in other words, between hypothesis and decision; and also between fact and interpretation. He says, (p. 58), "There are no data about life with which science cannot deal," adding, "there is no area of experience with which science

can deal fully." This is the basis on which there is to be partnership as the subtitle implies. This reviewer is sceptical. Mr. Long says (p. 60), "Psychology has every right and duty to seek an accurate description of religious experience and to include in this description the religious situations of conversion, mystical ecstacy, and worship." The problem is not so much one of psychology's right and duty, but, rather of the assumption involved in believing that it *can*—that it can without distorting the objects with which it allegedly deals. Love can not be completely described in terms of behavior. Yet the tendency to reduce love to behavior is implicit in the assumption that psychology can deal with it. The tendency is reinforced if the guardians of scientific method (e.g., Dewey) insist that all facts be "public." Furthermore, there are some "facts" which are created by decision: e.g., love. Since the scientific tentativity involved in the use of hypotheses is the very antithesis of the commitment involved in decision, it is, to say the least, doubtful if science can deal with all the facts. As Tillich has said, "There are objects for which the so-called 'objective' approach is the least objective of all because it is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of its object. This is especially true of religion. Unconcerned detachment in matters of religion (if it is more than a methodological self-restriction) implies an a priori rejection of the religious demand to be ultimately concerned. It denies the object which it is supposed to approach 'objectively.'" *(The Protestant Era,* p. xi.) Mr. Long sees the problem involved when he says (p. 77), "Philosophy by itself cannot judge the issues between science and religion since it never occupies a neutral position between them." But so far as this reviewer can see, he never faces the issue which this sets up for the partnership of the Christian faith and science.

It also seems to this reviewer that Mr. Long could have disclosed the nature of science more thoroughly if, in his chapter on the rise of science, he had considered more carefully its sociological and historical setting in the way Max Weber did in the introductory essay to his sociology of religion, reprinted as the introductory essay to the English translation of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.* It is the spirit of capitalism which informs much of modern science, especially as scientific method is applied in areas other than that of the natural sciences. It represents the attempt to bring the whole of life under the control of rational autonomy. There is, it seems likely, an inevitable and ultimately irreconcilable clash between this spirit and Christianity. At one point (pp. 62 ff.) Mr. Long strongly implies that the only problem technology presents is that it needs to be directed and used by those informed by the Christian faith. However, he himself remarks (p. 107), "We praise planning for material prosperity: the Sermon on the Mount suggests that we take no thought for tomorrow." Can Christianity entirely give up its ascetic or "rigoristic" tendency and remain Christian? If it does not do so can it cooperate completely with technology? Leaving aside the specific question of the effects of the machine as opposed to the use to which it is put, consider a broader and a slightly older one. Umphrey Lee has pointed out that many adherents of the social gospel held up St. Francis as their ideal and completely disregarded the fact that his ideal was not so much equality or justice as poverty. *(The Historic Church and Modern Pacifism,* pp. 115 ff.) Even if the atomic age is to be one of plenty rather than one of warfare, is it, from the point of view of the Christian faith, entirely desirable?

RICHARD W. DAY

THE RELIGIOUS REVOLT AGAINST REASON. *By L. Harold DeWolf.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949. $2.50.

Chapter II of Professor DeWolf's book summarizes the charges against reason made by Kierkegaard, Barth, Brunner, and Niebuhr as follows:

1. Charges against the objectivity of Reason
   a. that objectivity is Unchristian

b. that objectivity is impossible
c. that subjectivity is superior to objectivity

2. Charge of presumption and idolatry
3. Charges of ineffectiveness
   a. that reason never attains certainty
   b. that rational certainty would be fatal to faith
   c. that doubt is caused by sin and cannot be cured by reason
   d. that reason cannot comprehend existence
   e. that human reason cannot find God, the Wholly Other
   f. that the evil in experience is incapable of rational explanation
4. Charges of evil results
   a. that trust in reason substitutes theory for decision
   b. that dependence on reason leads to Pantheism
   c. that trust in reason implies denial of the paradoxical Christian Gospel.

Chapter III presents a point by point defense of reason and chapter IV attacks irrationalism, concluding with a warning that Kierkegaard, Barth and Brunner have no defenses against a Hitler! Chapter V in a more irenic spirit seeks to salvage some of the values in the "revolters" on the basis of a rationalism which will employ "a synoptic method which appeals to unlimited comprehensive coherence" and finds place for a fruitful interplay between faith and reason.

This book might more accurately have been entitled "An Answer to Kierkegaard's Irrationalism," for it deals chiefly with "something rotten in Denmark." There is much excellent criticism of Kierkegaard, particularly the concept of the "Wholly Other." (pp. 126–7). At times, however, he seriously misunderstands Kierkegaard when (pp. 52–3) he implies that he rejects the aesthetic level of existence, whereas Kierkegaard actually includes it within the religious level. The consideration of Barth, Brunner, and Niebuhr is far too fragmentary and too unguarded by critical definitions of "reason" to be convincing. The book appears to make two unfounded assumptions: (1) either one is a rationalist or an irrationalist, no gradations of complexity being possible; (2) a refutation of Kierkegaard implies the refutation of every other modern theological position except the Brightman concept of "coherence."

The author on the whole achieves considerable fairness in stating Kierkegaard's positions, but at times the anxious self of the rationalist theologian overcomes the cool detachment which reason demands. One wonders whether the adjective in his oft-repeated phrase, "Niebuhr's irrational paradox," is simply careless tautology or conscious or unconscious invective. The attempt to portray Jesus and Paul as rationalists (pp. 134–5) falls somewhat short of "comprehensive coherence" and illustrates the irrational temptation of a theologian with a method to impose his perspective upon the given.

In his concentration on Kierkegaard, Professor DeWolf has neglected whole dimensions in Niebuhr, Brunner, and Barth, which makes ridiculous a blanket label of irrationalism.

Barth *Dogmatics in Outline,* pp. 22: "Christendom and the theological world were always ill-advised in thinking it their duty for some reason or other to betake themselves to the camp of an opposition to reason."

Brunner *Revelation and Reason,* pp. 16–7: "Jesus Christ is not the enemy of reason, but only of the irrational arrogance of those who pride themselves on their intellect, and of the irrational self-sufficiency of reason."

Niebuhr *Faith and History,* p. 119: "The difference between structures of meaning is . . . not between supposedly 'rational' and supposedly 'irrational' ones. Supposedly rational frames of meaning may be irrational in the sense that an implicit and unacknowledged center and source of meaning may be inadequate to do justice to every dimension of human existence. . . A supposedly 'irrational' frame of meaning

may be rational in the sense that it acknowledges a center and source of meaning beyond the limits of rational intelligibility, partly because it 'rationally' senses the inadequacy or idolatrous character of centers and sources of meaning which are within the limits of rational intelligibility."

WILLIAM J. WOLF

THE CHRISTIAN DEMAND FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE. *Edited by William Scarlett.* New York: The New American Library (A Signet Special). 126 pp. $.25.

Bishop Scarlett has done it again. Three years ago, representing the Joint Commission on Social Reconstruction of the Protestant Episcopal Church, he edited the symposium, *Christianity Takes A Stand.* Published in a 25-cent edition, it sold many thousands of copies. The first symposium covered a great variety of problems; this second one centers on issues rising out of Communism's challenge to Western civilization. Regular writers for *Christianity and Society* have been represented in both books—Reinhold Niebuhr and Eduard Heimann in the first, and Charles Kean and Heimann in the second.

The variety of viewpoints and professions represented in the book is evident in the list of authors: Clergymen Theodore O. Wedel and Kean; economists and economic philosophers Heimann, John M. Clark, R. H. Tawney, and George Hedley; industrialist Paul G. Hoffman; and labor leader Victor Reuther. Presuppositions and conclusions vary widely among these writers. Some papers are popular, some abstruse. So the unity of the book inheres solely in the interest in a common problem.

Yet among all these authors there appears to be agreement on Clark's thesis that the only thinkable development for America is in the mid-range between thorough-going laissez-faire and complete collectivism. Agreement on this near-truism may seem insignificant. Yet such agreement eliminates irreconcilable arguments between hostile ideologies and sets the issues for debate in a context which makes possible solution by persuasion and experiment. Here is surely an encouraging sign. So far as such an attitude spreads, the dangers of doctrinaire demagoguery from left and right are reduced.

The book is aimed for use in study groups within churches. For such use it might be wise to start with Chapter IV by Clark and run through to the end of the book; these chapters are fairly popularly written and are certainly provocative of discussion. By this time the group might be better prepared than at the beginning for Heimann's penetrating discussion, "A Christian Looks at Communism," and for the theological contributions of Wedel and Kean.

Special mention should be given to Tawney's chapter on "Social Democracy in Britain," an essay occupying one-fourth of the book. Tawney's reputation is well established among readers of this journal; here he traces the background and tells some of the objectives and problems of Britain's Labor government. The chapter is the more interesting because, unlike Britain's politicians who labor under an enforced meekness in their relations with America, Tawney does not hesitate to snap back, sometimes with stinging wit, at irresponsible American criticisms of the British program.

ROGER L. SHINN

ELMTOWN'S YOUTH: THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL CLASSES ON ADOLESCENTS. *By August B. Hollingshead.* New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1949. 480 pp. $5.

Elmtown is a small county seat town, spread out on the prairies, somewhere east of Peoria. In its economic dependence upon the surrounding farms and a few small industries, in its general attitudes and social orientation, Elmtown is typical of hundreds of other Middle Western communities whose population also lies somewhere between five and fifteen thousand. For a year and a half beginning in the spring of 1941, Elmtown was the subject of an intensive study of the relationship

between the social system of the community and the social behavior of high-school-aged adolescents. Sociologist A. B. Hollingshead and his wife, who together dug systematically and thoroughly into the life of this town and its citizens, have written an unusually readable and quite competent account of their investigations.

The bulk of the book is designed to test and verify this hypothesis: "The social behavior of adolescents is related functionally to the position their families occupy in the social structure of the community." Professor Hollingshead's data has been carefully assembled, in large part through the slow process of cultivating friendships with the 735 boys and girls of high school age who resided in the community and its surrounding farmlands. In writing he relies heavily on the words and remarks of Elmtowners to help him fill out the story for which statistics provide the bare framework. Most of the volume is an analysis of the community setting of Elmtown, followed by a study of the 390 boys and girls in high school, and finally a section on the 345 adolescents who have dropped out.

The picture of the community which emerges is a disturbing one, for it indicates how sharply the adult world is divided into class groups, with a minimum of mobility between them. One is surprised not so much at the existence of such clearly drawn class lines, but at the fact that nearly every adult in the community is aware of their existence and continually reacting in defense or opposition (Chapter 4). More important, the class structure of the adult world is forced upon the adolescent in every area of his life, limiting to a great degree the kind of equality of opportunity which our democracy so cherishes. In the realm of education this is particularly clear. The whole school system is based on the assumption that children should be prepared for college, when in reality a negligible proportion will ever receive any education beyond high school. The weight of the community again and again drives children from lower class homes out of school. At the time of the study 47% of the high school generation were out of school. It was noted in the study that no relief was given to a family if children over 14 were still in school.

In the excellent last chapter Professor Hollingshead points up this problem of lack of social mobility which his study has raised. The class into which one is born steadily forces one from birth to become a type of person different from children born into other classes. Not the ideal of our American democratic creed, but an ideology based on class lines, with the tacit assumption that links success or failure in the economic sphere with social position, is the faith by which Elmtown is ruled (p. 449).

The relation of the churches to the community might better not be mentioned. Such little matters as the minister who maintained a spy system within the school to make sure no heresy was taught can perhaps be overlooked, but not the utter and complete failure of the churches 1) to resist in any way the utter secularism of the community, 2) to understand adolescents, 3) to minister to the great bulk of men and women in the two lower, though numerically predominant, classes in Elmtown.

WILLIAM G. WEBBER

KILLERS OF THE DREAM. *By Lillian Smith.* New York: Norton. $3.00.

Only those who go frequently into the South and have intimate contacts there may actually understand either what Lillian Smith is getting at in her latest book, *Killers of the Dream,* or what enormous freedom of spirit is required to send out a book whose reception in some quarters is sure to be so dubious. Nor is this said in a mood of defeatism about the South, for the South is probably the most vital part of America today and the most pregnant with possibilities for new and different results. The very harshness of reaction there is a symbol of the amazing progress of liberalism and the rapid changes which are taking place in the direction of justice, democracy and

leadership which has paid price enough
r its insights to be competent and, in the
st sense, courageous.

Killers of the Dream should have no dubi-
s welcome in the Frontier Fellowship.
e are committed as a Fellowship to con-
ant examination of those social phenom-
a which deny or create, as the case may
, a democratic society. Racial prejudice
not only as subtle as sin itself, but it is
t confined to the South. Its masks and
capes and self-deceits are legion and know
o geography. For example, the review of
is book by Mr. Orville Prescott in the
ew York Times seems to me to illustrate
is fact. Not only does he refer to Miss
nith patronizingly as "an idealistic and
lligerent Southern lady" (men like Mr.
rescott always refer to women in public
e whom they do not admire as "ladies"
stead of women), but he refers to the
ok as near hysteria, damns it by faint
aise, calling her truest suggestions merely
onventional," and finally he chooses one
her best paragraphs as an illustration of
notional anarchy on the author's part.
me of this type of reviewing may be Mr.
escott's incisiveness as a good literary
itic and some of it may be that subtle re-
stance which so many of us in both North
d South feel toward an unmasked dealing
th this difficult and controversial national
sue.

Miss Smith has tackled her problem, as
e has in other of her writings, from the
ycho-analytic angle and as a *white* prob-
m rather than primarily a Negro one. She
ally poses the question as to what it is
at we white Americans are afraid of. Her
jectives are never lost sight of throughout
e discussion, although she must venture
wn several by-paths. She is a superb
alyst and reveals to us convincingly why
e South has been caught as it has been,
d still is, in this terror of taboos, unholy
ars, and bad practices, many of which also
ip the North with equal though somewhat
fferent intensity. She is an unalterable
e of segregation, as any Christian and
y democrat must be. In this time when
e ecumenical movement is making a brave effort to get at the problem of women in the church and in society, Miss Smith makes a not inconsiderable contribution and an exceedingly timely one in her chapter entitled, "The Women."

Some of the points she makes most effectively will never have occurred to the average reader and will dig themselves deep into our minds and consciousness as we read. This is particularly true of the main theme, "sin, sex, and segregation." Neither the alliteration nor the sensational character of this theme may rob it of its potency or its relevance.

Miss Smith's writing is uneven in quality. Some chapters read like poetry and others are somewhat pedestrian. The closing chapter might have been superimposed by the publishers, so little does it sound like Miss Smith. Her use of the word "equality" and the interpretation she puts upon it seems to some inaccurate and unfortunate. She has thrown "equality" to the communists to do with what they will and striven to make her case on freedom and dignity alone. This may be a problem in semantics or it may be an especially unfortunate capitulation in view of the fact that the traditional Southern attitude seizes upon the word equality as the central bugaboo. Much of the rest of the last chapter is sound thinking about differences and varieties in human function so that true democracy may result from recognition of differences of capacity and honest effort to set people free and make them creatures of dignity and responsibility. Perhaps we should recommend to Miss Smith that she read *Freedom and Order* written by our own Eduard Heimann in order that she may see his interpretation of the relation of order to freedom and hence to equality in the dignity of man.

I would not conclude this brief reference to *Killers of the Dream* without again expressing my enthusiasm for it and for its author. It is one of the books which takes the steps we are taking as a nation in the direction of a more adequate civilization. Its measurements can be trusted.

WINNIFRED WYGAL

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